Introduction
In a previous paper [10] we introduced a hierarchy (G n A ω ) n∈IN of subsystems of classical arithmetic in all finite types where the growth of definable functions of G n A ω corresponds to the well-known Grzegorczyk hierarchy. Let AC-qf denote the schema of quantifier-free choice. [8] , [10] and subsequent papers (under preparation) study various analytical principles Γ in the context of the theories G n A ω +AC-qf (mainly for n = 2) and use proof-theoretic tools like e.g. monotone functional interpretation (which was introduced in [9] ) to determine their impact on the growth of uniform bounds Φ such that
which are extractable from given proofs (based on these principles Γ) of sentences ∀u 1 , k 0 ∀v ≤ ρ tuk∃w 0 A 0 (u, k, v, w).
Here A 0 (u, k, v, w) is quantifier-free and contains only u, k, v, w as free variables; t is a closed term and ≤ ρ is defined pointwise. The term 'uniform bound' refers to the fact that Φ does not depend on v ≤ ρ tuk (see [9] for the relevance of such uniform bounds in numerical analysis and for concrete applications to approximation theory).
It turns out that many principles (e.g. the attainment of the maximum of f ∈ C([0 d , Dini's theorem and others) do not contribute significantly to the growth at all and for proofs using these principles relative to G 2 A ω +AC-qf the extractability of bounds Φuk which are polynomials in u M n := max(u0, . . . , un), k is guaranteed (or if the proof relies on certain functions of exponential growth which are not iterated in the proof, then the bound will be of polynomial growth relative to these functions, see [8] , [10] , [12] ).
As is well-known (cf. the discussion at the end of §3 of [10] ), the use of classical logic (on which the systems G n A ω are based) has the consequence that the extractability of an effective (and for n = 2 polynomial) bound from a proof of an ∀∃A-sentence is (in general) guaranteed only if A is quantifierfree (or purely existential). In the present paper we study proofs which may use mathematically strong non-constructive analytical principles as e.g. where y is not free in A, plus the schema AC of full choice but apply these principles only in the context of the intuitionistic versions (E)-G n A ω i of the theories (E)-G n A ω . The restriction to intuitionistic logic guarantees the extractability of (uniform) effective bounds for arbitrary ∀∃A-sentences (see theorem 4.1 below). Indeed we are able to extract uniform bounds Φ (given by closed terms of G n A ω i ) such that
from such proofs of sentences
where G, H are arbitrary formulas (such that (+) is closed).
The phenomenon that we may use even strong positive existence principles as the comprehension schema CA ρ ¬ for all types ρ (which both classical and intuitionistically produces the strength of classical simple type theory) without any impact on the growth of Φ is a consequence of the fact that instead of analytical axioms ∆ only, having the form ∀x δ ∃y ≤ ρ sx∀z τ A 0 (x, y, z) with quantifier-free to the list of allowed principles above. Although 11) and 12) are classically refutable strengthened versions of Dini's theorem resp. the Heine-Borel theorem we may use them (combined with the non-constructive principles listed above) and the extractable bounds Φ are nevertheless classically valid (i.e. the conclusion holds in the full set-theoretic type structure S ω ). For this result essential use of the 'non-standard' axiom F introduced in [10] is made.
These results also apply to the theory PRA ω i , which contains all primitive recursive functionals Φ ∈ PR ω in the sense of Kleene, as well as to PA ω i which has the schema of full induction and is based on Gödel's primitive recursive functionals T . Then the extractable bounds are ∈ PR ω resp. ∈ T .
The methods by which these extractions of bounds are achieved are new monotone versions of the 'modified realizability' and 'modified realizability with truth' interpretations.
Majorization and monotone realizability
The set T of all finite types is defined inductively by
Terms which denote a natural number have type 0. Elements of type τ (ρ) are functions which map objects of type ρ to objects of type τ . The set P ⊂ T of pure types is defined by (i) 0 ∈ P and (ii) ρ ∈ P ⇒ 0(ρ) ∈ P.
Brackets whose occurrences are uniquely determined are often omitted, e.g. we write 0(00) instead of 0(0(0)). Furthermore we write for short τ ρ k . . . ρ 1 instead of τ (ρ k ) . . . (ρ 1 ). Pure types can be represented by natural numbers: 0(n) := n + 1. The types 0, 00, 0(00), 0(0(00)) . . . are so represented by 0, 1, 2, 3 . . .. For arbitrary types ρ ∈ T the degree of ρ (for short deg(ρ) ) is defined by deg(0) := 0 and deg(τ (ρ)) := max(deg(τ ),deg(ρ) + 1). For pure types the degree is just the number which represents this type.
Description of the theories (E)-G
Our theories T ω i , T ω used in this paper are based on many-sorted intuitionistic (indicated by the subscript i) or classical logic formulated in the language of all finite types plus the combinators Π ρ,τ , Σ δ,ρ,τ which allow the definition of λ-abstraction. The systems G n A ω (i) (for all n ≥ 1) are introduced in [10] to which we refer for details. G n A ω i has as primitive relations = 0 , ≤ 0 for type-0-objects, the constant 0 0 , functions min 0 , max 0 , S (successor),
A 0 , . . . , A n , where A i is the i-th branch of the Ackermann function (more precisely Furthermore we have a quantifier-free rule of extensionality QF-ER. In addition to the defining axioms for the constants of our theories we add all true sentences having the form ∀x ρ A 0 (x), where A 0 is quantifier-free and deg(ρ) ≤ 2, as axioms. Here 'true' refers to the full set-theoretic model S ω . Of course in concrete proofs only very special universal axioms will be used which can be proved in suitable extensions of our theories. However in order to stress that (proofs of) universal sentences do not contribute to the growth of extractable bounds we include them all as axioms. In particular this covers all instances of the schema of quantifier-free induction (The main results in section 3 are also valid for the variant of G n A ω i where the universal axioms are replaced by the schema of quantifier-free induction). The restriction deg(ρ) ≤ 2 has the reason that at some places we make use of the type structure M ω of all so-called strongly majorizable functionals (which was introduced in [2] ) and the fact that S ω |= ∀x
The systems PRA 
for all finite types (x = ρ y is defined as ∀z
Definition 2.1 Between functionals of type ρ we define relations ≤ ρ ('less or equal') and s-maj ρ ('strongly majorizes') by induction on the type:
Remark 2.2 's-maj' is a variant of W.A. Howard's relation 'maj' from [5] which is due to [2] . For more details see [6] . 
3)
Definition 2.5 1) The subset G n R ω − ⊂G n R ω denotes the set of all terms which are built up from
Proposition 2.6 For all n ≥ 1 the following holds: For each term t ρ ∈G n R ω one can construct by induction on the structure of t (without normalization) a term t
An analogous result holds for
Proof: For G n R ω the result is proved in [10] . For T it is essentially due to Howard [5] and follows from [2] . An analogous proof applies to PR ω observing that quantifier-free induction is sufficient for the proof the majorizability of the Kleene-recursors.
Then one can construct (by majorization and subsequent 'logical' normalization) a
In particular:
Proof: See [10] (cor.2.2.24 and remark 2.2.25).
We call Φ 0(0)(1) uk a polynomial (resp. a finitely iterated exponential function) in
Φuk can be written as a term t[u, k] 0 which is built up from 0
only (see [10] for a detailed discussion of these notions).
¿From the corollary above and the fact that u M s-maj 1 u it follows that for every Φ
i.e. Φuk is bounded by a polynomial (resp. a finitely iterated exponential function) in u M and k.
The methods by which our extraction of bounds is achieved are monotone versions of the so-called 'modified realizability' interpretations mr and mrt. Modified realizability was introduced in [13] and is studied in great detail in [14] and [16] (to which we refer). Whereas the usual modified realizability interpretation extracts tuples of closed terms t = t 1 , . . . , t k such that t mr A (where A is a closed formula, the types of t i and the length k of the tuple depends only on the logical form of A, and 'x mr A' (in words 'x (modified) realizes A') is a formula defined by induction on A) we are interested in majorants of such realizing terms, i.e. t * 1 , . . . , t * k such that
By saying that 't * fulfils the monotone mr-interpretation of A' we simply mean that 't * fulfils (+)'
(analogously for the 'modified realizability with truth' variant mrt of mr).
) such terms t * can be obtained by applying at first the usual mr-interpretation and subsequent construction of majorants for the resulting terms by proposition 2.6. As in the case of functional interpretation (see our development of the 'monotone functional interpretation' for PA ω i in [9] and its application to G n A ω i in [10] ) it is also possible to extract such majorizing terms directly from a given proof, i.e. without extracting t at first. However the simplification achieved in this way is not as significant as for the functional interpretation since no decision of prime formulas is needed for the mr-interpretation of intuitionistic logic (in contrast to usual functional interpretation, where this is avoided only by our monotone variant) and it will be therefore not studied further. The monotone mr-interpretation has the same nice behaviour w.r.t. to the modus ponens as the usual mr-interpretation. Hence in order to treat the extension of E-G n A ω i by new axioms, we only have to consider what terms are needed to fulfil their monotone mr-interpretation (and what principles are necessary to verify them). We will show that for a closed axiom
any majorant s * for s satisfies its monotone mr-interpretation (provably in E-G n A ω i + ( * )+b-AC), whereas such axioms in general do not have a usual mr-interpretation by computable functionals at all. So sentences ( * ) contribute to extractable bounds only by majorants for the terms occuring in their formulation but not by their proofs. That is why we can treat them as axioms (if they are true in the full set-theoretical type structure S ω or -as the non-standard axiom F from [10] -in the type structure of all strongly majorizable functionals M ω , see below).
The schema of choice is defined as AC := δ,ρ∈T (AC δ,ρ ) , where
2) The schema of 'bounded' choice is defined as b-AC := δ,ρ∈T
(a discussion of this principle can be found in [6] ).
3 Extraction of uniform bounds from partially constructive proofs by monotone realizability
The independence-of-premise schema IP ¬ for negated formulas is defined as
where y is not free in A.
Notational convention 3.2 In the theorems of this paper we consider always closed formulas, i.e. e.g. in the theorem below A, B, C resp. D contain (at most) x, (x, y), (u, v) resp. (u, v, w) as free variables.
. Then the following holds:
and therefore
(If the type of w is 0 and n = 2 (resp. n = 3) Ψu is a polynomial (resp. a finitely iterated exponential function) in u M ).
An analogous result holds for E-PRA
Proof: By intuitionistic logic (and the decidability of prime formulas) one shows
and
Hence the assumption gives
By prop.2.6 we can construct a term s
By the definition of mrt and the easy fact that (x mrt ¬F ) ↔ ¬F (and x is the empty sequence) for negated formulas one shows
(+) now follows by taking u :
Thus T (+AC+IP ¬ ) has a monotone mrt-interpretation in itself by terms ∈G n R ω − . In particular (by the assumption) one can extract Ψ = Ψ 1 , . . . ,
The following implications hold in E-G n A ω i :
It remains to show that In case u 2) If the variable x is not present (i.e. if we only have closed axioms A → ∃y ≤ s¬B(y), then the conclusion can be proved without b-AC.
3) Instead of a single axiom ∀x(A → ∃y ≤ sx¬B) we may also use a finite set of such axioms. 3) If A is ∃-free and B ∈ Γ 1 , then (∃xA → B) ∈ Γ 1 .
Definition 3.8 ([14])
The independence-of-premise schema for ∃-free formulas is defined as
where A is ∃-free and does not contain y as a free variable.
Remark 3.9 Because of the fact that in our theories we can derive ¬¬P ↔ P for prime formulas P , IP ¬ implies IP ∃f . In the presence of AC also the converse implication holds. 5 Troelstra distinguishes between negative formulas which are built up from the double negation ¬¬P of prime formulas (instead of the arbitrary quantifier-free formulas in our definition) and ∃-free formulas where P instead of ¬¬P may be used. Since our theories have only decidable prime formulas both notions coincide with our definition up to equivalence in E-GnA ω i . 6 Note that in our theories quantifier-free formulas can be written a prime formulas s = 0 t. Theorem 3.10 Let A, D be ∈ Γ 1 and B, C denote ∃-free formulas; s, t ∈ G n R ω (n ≥ 1). Then the following rule holds
Proof: Since quantifier-free formulas can be transformed into formulas tx = 0 0, we may assume that the ∃-free formulas B, C do not contain ∨. The assumption of the theorem implies
We now show that T has a monotone mr-interpretation in T − := T \ {AC,IP ¬ } by terms ∈ G n R ω − . For E-G n A ω i + AC+IP ¬ this follows from the proof of the fact that E-HA ω + AC+IP ¬ has a mr-interpretation in E-HA ω (see [14] , [16] ) combined with our remarks in §2 and prop.2.6 (The mr-interpretation of AC+IP ¬ requires only terms built up from Π, Σ). Next we show that
Since for ∃-free formulas (x mr B) ≡ B (x being the empty sequence) the mr-definition yields
The right side of this equivalence is fulfilled by taking u := Y since ∃v(v mr A) → A (because of the assumption A ∈ Γ 1 ). Hence T has a monotone mr-interpretation in T − by terms ∈ G n R ω − . Therefore ( * ) implies the extractability of terms Ψ = Ψ 1 , . . . , Ψ k ∈ G n R ω − such that ∃χ Ψ s-maj χ ∧ χ mr (∀u∀v ≤ tu(C → ∃wD(w))) .
The following chain of implications holds in E-
As in the proof of the previous theorem one shows E-G n A ω + b-AC ⊢ ∀x(A → ∃y ≤ sx B) → ∃Y ≤ s∀x(A → B).
Corollary 3.11 (to the proof )
1) If A ≡ ¬Ã is a negated (resp. ∃-free) formula, then the conclusion can be proved in E-G n A
2) If the variable x is not present, i.e. if only axioms A → ∃y ≤ sx B(y) are used (A ∈ Γ 1 , B ∃-free), then the conclusion can be proved without b-AC.
3) Instead of a single axiom ∀x(A → ∃y ≤ sx B(y)) we may also use a finite set of such axioms.
Remark 3.12 For every ∃-free formula A of our theories the equivalence A ↔ ¬¬A holds intuitionistically (since the prime formulas are stable). So the allowed axioms in theorem 3.3 include the axioms allowed in theorem 3.10.
Although theorem 3.10 is weaker than theorem 3.3 in some respects (e.g. A, D have to be in Γ 1 ) it is of interest for the following reason: Despite the fact that the schema AC of full choice may be used in the proof of the assumption, the proof of the conclusion uses only b-AC instead of AC. This has the consequence that the conclusion is valid in the model M ω of all strongly majorizable functionals, if ∀x(A → ∃y ≤ sx B) holds in M ω (although M ω |= / AC, see [6] ). Let us e.g. consider the theory E-G n A ω i + F +AC, where F is the 'non-standard'-axiom studied in [10] :
F is valid in M ω (see [10] and also the proof of theorem 4.2 below) but does not hold in S ω (see [10] ). Since F has the form ∀x(A → ∃y ≤ sx B) (with A :≡ (0 = 0) ∈ Γ 1 and B ∃-free) of an allowed axiom in theorem 3.10 (and a fortiori in theorem 3.3 ) we can apply theorem 3.10 and obtain the following rule
The conlusion of this rule implies (see the proof of theorem 4.9 in [10] )
If all positively occuring ∀x ρ -quantifiers and all negatively occuring ∃x ρ -quantifiers in this formula have types ρ ≤ 1 and if all other quantifiers have types ≤ 2, then we can conclude (since M 1 = S 1 and M 2 ⊂ S 2 , for details see [10] (remark 4.10))
Hence the bound Ψ is classically valid although it has been extracted from a proof in a theory which classically is inconsistent:
Proof of the claim: Consider
which holds by classical logic. AC yields the existence of a functional Ψ 0(1) such that
F applied to Ψ implies that Ψ is bounded on
which -of course-is wrong.
The (intuitionistically consistent) combination of F and AC (instead of quantifier-free choice AC-qf only, which we have used in the classical setting of [10] in order to derive the principle Σ 0 1 -UB of uniform boundedness for Σ 0 1 -formulas) can be used to prove strengthened versions of various classical theorems which may have non-constructive counterexamples, but no constructive ones. These proofs rely on the fact that F and AC prove a very general principle of uniform boundedness for arbitrary formulas A:
where A is an arbitrary formula of L(E-G n A ω ) which may contain parameters of arbitrary type.
Proof: ∀k
AC yields
Hence by extensionality (E) (using that x ≤ 1 yk → min 1 (x, yk) = 1 x)
F applied to Φ yields a function χ 1 (namely χk := Φk(y 0 k)) such that
Example 1: Pointwise convergence implies uniform convergence or 'Dini's theorem without monotonicity and continuity assumption' Proof: By the assumption we have
By prop.3.13 and the fact that '∀x [11] , [12] for details) one obtains
Remark 3.14 1) The usual counterexamples to the theorem above do not occur in E-G n A ω i since they use classical logic to verify the assumption of pointwise convergence: E.g. consider the well-known example Φ n (x) := max IR (n − n 2 |x − 1 n |, 0) (n ≥ 1). The proof that Φ n converges pointwise to 0 requires the instance '∀x ∈ [0, 1](x = IR 0 ∨ x > IR 0)' of the tertium-non-datur schema, which cannot be proved in E-G n A ω i .
2) Note that in the classical setting (see [9] , [12] ) the monotonicity assumption of Dini's theorem is used just to eliminate the universal quantifier '∀l ≥ 0 n' which reduces the application of the general principle of uniform boundedness to an application of its restriction Σ 0 1 -UB to Σ 0 1 -formulas (since ≤ IR can be replaced by < IR ), which follows from F and quantifier-free choice. 
Proof: Similarly to the proof of example 1 using prop.3.13.
Remark 3.15
The restriction to open balls in the classical context of G 2 A ω is needed in order to restrict the use of uniform boundedness to Σ 0 1 -UB (see [12] for details).
Examples of sentences having (in E-
1) The attainment of the maximum of f ∈ C([0, 1] d , IR), the mean value theorem of integration, the Cauchy-Peano existence theorem, Brouwer's fixed point theorem and others can be expressed as axioms H (and a fortiori as axioms G, see the remark below).
2) The generalization of the axiom F to arbitrary types ρ:
(see the proof of theorem 4.2 below) has the form of an axiom H (and so a fortiori can be
3) Our generalization
of the binary König's lemma WKL from [10] has the form H (and therefore can be written as
4) The universal closure of each instance of the 'double negation shift' DNS : ∀x¬¬A → ¬¬∀x A has the form G.
5) The 'lesser limited principle of omniscience' is defined as:
where
LLPO can be formulated also in the following equivalent form
LLPO has the form of an axiom H and so can be written as an axiom G (see [3] for a discussion of LLPO).
6) Comprehension for negated (resp. ∃-free) formulas:
By intuitionistic logic (and the decidability of prime formulas) we have
Hence the universal closure of each instance of CA the theorems mentioned in 1) above can be expressed as sentences ∆ (see [8] ) and so a fortiori as sentences H, G. For H, G even a much more simple representation suffices since H, G are by far less restrictive than ∆. Let us sketch the formalization of the assertion that every f ∈ C[0, 1] attains its maximum:
Real numbers (with fixed rate of convergence) can be represented by functions
represent the corresponding relations resp. operations on IR. Elements x ∈ [0, 1] can be represented by functions x 1 which are bounded by some fixed [11] ).
Hence our assertion can be expressed as follows:
which clearly has the form H (and a fortiori can be written as an axiom G). Moreover by this simple representation it is sufficient to assume that Φ represents a pointwise continuous function [0, 1] → IR whereas the representation needed in order to express the assertion as an axiom ∈ ∆ requires that Φ is endowed with a modulus of uniform continuity (In the classical setting of [10] this is no restriction since using F − (which can be eliminated from the proof of the verification of the extracted bound) and AC-qf one can prove that every pointwise continuous
IR possesses a modulus of uniform continuity, see [8] , [12] . The same is true in the intuitionistic context of theorem 4.2 below but not for theorem 4.1 since F is not an allowed axiom ∈ A).
2) WKL
2 seq does not have the form of an axiom ∈ ∆ and therefore had to be derived from F and AC-qf in the classical context of [10] . In E-G n A ω i it can be treated directly as an axiom.
3) DNS and LLPO follow of course from classical logic but are not derivable in E-G n A ω i . 4) F ρ and AC prove a principle of uniform boundedness for the type ρ: One limitation for applications of the theorems 3.3 and 3.10 is due to the fact that the Markov principle
is not an allowed axiom, not even in its weak form
where A 0 is a quantifier-free formula.
In fact the addition of M pr would make the theory E-G n A ω i +AC+F +IP ¬ inconsistent:
Together with AC and F this gives a contradiction (as in the proof of the claim above).
As we have discussed in [9] many ∀∃-sentences in classical analysis come from sentences
by prenexation to
what intuitionistically just needs M pr (Here X is a complete separable metric space and F, G : X → IR are constructive functions). We now prove a theorem which covers M ω but still allows the extraction of bounds for arbitrary ∀∃-sentences. The price we have to pay for this is that the allowed axioms have to be restricted to the class ∆ from the theorems in [10] (and that we can use only the quantifier-free rule of extensionality instead of (E)). Theorem 3.18 Let s, t ∈ G n R ω (n ≥ 1), A 0 , B 0 be quantifier-free and C be an arbitrary formula (respecting the convention made before theorem 3.3). Then
An analogous result holds for PRA
Proof: As an abbreviation we define T :
By the assumption and IP ω 0 we obtain
Monotone functional interpretation extracts (using the proof of theorem 3.2.2 in [10] and the fact that the monotone interpretation of AC+IP ω 0 + M ω is as trivial as their usual functional interpretation) a termΨ ∈ G n R ω − such that
By [14] (3.5.10) we have T ⊢ A D ↔ A for all formulas A. Hencẽ
and thus
Since AC implies
the proof is finished.
4 Growth of functional dependencies for logically complex formulas in (non-constructive) analytical proofs relatively to the intuitionistic theories E-G n A ω i
Let us summarize now the main consequences of the results obtained in this paper on the growth of uniform bounds which are extractable from partially constructive proofs in analysis:
Let A be the set of the following theorems and principles: 7) The 'lesser limited principle of omniscience'
8) Comprehension for negated formulas:
, where A is arbitrary (Φ not free in A).
Theorem 4.1 Let γ ≤ 2, n ≥ 2, t ∈ G n R ω and C, D arbitrary formulas of E-G n A ω such that
Then the following rule holds
and therefore S ω |= ∀u 1 , k 0 ∀v ≤ τ tu k∃w ≤ γ Φu k ¬C → D(u, k, v, w) .
(For γ = 0 and n = 2 (resp. n = 3) Ψu k is a polynomial (resp. an finitely iterated exponential function) in u M and k).
An analogous result holds E-PRA (For γ = 0 and n = 2 (resp. n = 3) Ψu k is a polynomial (resp. an finitely iterated exponential function) in u M and k).
An analogous result holds E-PRA Proof: The first part of the theorem follows from theorem 3.10 (and remark 3.4), the fact that the principles 1)-8) from B have the logical form ∀x G → ∃y ≤ sxH (where G ∈ Γ 1 and H is ∃-free, see remark 3.16) and the fact that principles 9)-11) follow from AC and F relatively to E-G 2 A ω i (see above). We now show M ω |= B − (and therefore M ω |= E-G n A ω +b-AC+B − ):
For 1)-4) this follows immediately from the representation of analytical objects given in [8] by which these principles can be expressed as sentences having the form (+) ∀x 1 ∃y ≤ 1 sx∀z 0/1 A 0 (x, y, z) (where A 0 is quantifier-free). As in [10] (proof of 4.9, remark 4.10), the truth of (+) in S ω implies its truth in M ω (using M 1 = S 1 ).
For the more 'liberal' representation as indicated in remark 3.16.1) above this also is clear since M 2 ⊂ S 2 and the only quantifier of type > 1 '∀Φ 1(1) ' occurs positively. The same is true for the corresponding formalization of 2),4). In 3) (in its naive formalization) one gets a positive ∃-quantifier
